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Current emission pledges to the Paris Agreement appear insufficient to hold the global average 11 
temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels1. Yet, details are missing on how to 12 
track progress towards the ‘Paris goal’, inform the five-yearly ‘global stocktake’, and increase the 13 
ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). We develop a nested structure of key 14 
indicators to track progress through time. Global emissions2,3 track aggregated progress1, country-15 
level decomposition track emerging trends4-6 that link directly to NDCs7, and technology diffusion8-10 16 
indicates future reductions. We find the recent slowdown in global emissions growth11 is due to 17 
reduced growth in coal consumption since 2011, primarily in China and secondarily the United 18 
States12. The slowdown is projected to continue in 2016, with global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels 19 
and industry similar to the 2015 level of 36GtCO2. Explosive, policy-driven growth in wind and solar 20 
has contributed to the global emissions slowdown, but has been less important than economic factors 21 
and energy efficiency. We show that many key indicators are currently broadly consistent with 22 
emission scenarios that keep temperatures well below 2°C, but the continued lack of large-scale 23 
Carbon Capture and Storage13 threatens 2030 targets and the longer-term Paris ambition of net-zero 24 
emissions. 25 
Tracking progress of individual countries towards a collective global climate target requires a hierarchy 26 
of indicators spanning different levels of detail and periods of time (Figure 1). At the aggregated level 27 
one could track global temperature, atmospheric concentrations, and greenhouse gas emissions2,3; CO2 28 
emissions are particularly relevant due to their dominant role in perturbing the climate system and 29 
strong connections to climate policy. We project global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry in 30 
2016 to be 36GtCO2 (see Methods), approximately the same as emissions in 2014 and 2015, indicating 31 
that growth in global CO2 emissions has stalled, at least temporarily11. While zero global emissions 32 
growth is a positive step in addressing climate change, cumulative emissions are still rising and 33 
emissions need to rapidly decrease until they reach zero to remain consistent with the Paris 34 
Agreement1. 35 
More relevant for policy implementation is to track progress nationally to assess historical and future 36 
trends in emissions4-6, progress towards emission pledges14, and the adequacy of pledges to achieve 37 
global targets1. Chinese emissions grew at 10%/yr in the 2000’s, but have been largely stable since 2013 38 
potentially indicating a peak in emissions earlier than expected12. US emissions declined from 2007 to 39 
2012 at over -2%/yr due to a weaker economy, a shift from coal to gas, and growth in renewables15, but 40 
emissions have been relatively flat since 2012. EU emissions declined by -0.7%/yr from 2000-2010 and -41 
2.2%/yr from 2011-2015, ensuring the EU is on track to meeting its 2030 emission pledge. India has had 42 
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sustained emissions growth of 5-6%/yr over the last decade, and even with its NDC, it is expected that 43 
high growth rates will continue into the future16.  44 
It is not clear if the driving forces behind these global and country-level trends will be sustained in the 45 
future. If the observed trends are driven by strengthening of energy and climate policies, then good 46 
progress can be expected towards achievement of the NDCs, with available options for raising mitigation 47 
ambitions. If the trends are largely due to lingering economic weakness17, or other short-term factors, 48 
then emissions growth may rebound18. Disentangling the factors causing short-term changes in 49 
emissions is critical, otherwise current or future policies may be inconsistent with emission pledges1.  50 
The implementation of the Paris Agreement requires a consistent and harmonised approach to track 51 
progress at different levels of detail and over different time periods. The Kaya Identity is one such 52 
approach5, in which different components form an interconnected and nested structure (Figure 1, see 53 
Methods). Each component of the identity can be decomposed into measurable indicators directly 54 
impacted by energy and climate policy5, which themselves can be further decomposed. Many countries 55 
already express their climate policies in terms of Kaya components, such as the energy intensity of Gross 56 
Domestic Product (GDP), or sub-components such as the share of non-fossil energy in total energy 57 
consumption7.  58 
The indicators in the top three layers of Figure 1 are the outcomes of dynamics that occur at a more 59 
detailed level (bottom two layers). The carbon intensity of fossil fuel combustion (layer 3) can be 60 
reduced by substituting coal with natural gas or by using Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS; layer 4). The 61 
share of fossil fuels in energy consumption (layer 3) can be decreased by replacing fossil fuels with 62 
renewables (layer 4). The diffusion of new technologies may require longer-term investments, research 63 
and development19, which may be tracked9 via private and public investments16, price development8 and 64 
deployment13 (layer 5). If technological progress is more rapid than expected, it may support and drive 65 
increased ambition of country pledges.  66 
We explore this nested structure using global and country-level data (Figure 1). We focus on the Kaya-67 
derived indicators: CO2 emissions (layer 1); GDP, energy intensity of GDP (e.g., energy efficiency), and 68 
CO2 per unit energy (layer 2); and CO2 intensity of fossil fuels and share of fossil fuels in total energy 69 
consumption (layer 3). These indicators are the most relevant for the current slowdown in CO2 70 
emissions growth11, are important indicators in emission scenarios consistent with the Paris goal20, and 71 
cover the diversity of energy-related indicators used in the NDCs. We focus on emissions from the 72 
energy system (fossil fuel use) because this represents the largest share of current and future CO2 73 
emissions. The drivers are different for CO2 emissions not derived from energy consumption, such as 74 
cement (5% of global total) and land-use change (10% global total)21.  75 
A decomposition of the world and key countries (Figure 2 and Supplementary Figure 1) shows that 76 
growth in GDP (green) has exerted upward pressure on CO2 emissions, in most cases only partially offset 77 
by downward pressure from improved energy intensity of GDP (purple) and lower carbon intensity of 78 
energy (orange). Country trajectories differ, but when averaging over years to decades to remove 79 
interannual variability, three factors are most prominent (Figure 2). First, GDP growth in the EU28, US, 80 
and China has been lower in the decade 2005-2015 compared to 1995-2005 (values in 2010 and 2000 in 81 
Figure 2) leading to lower emissions growth in the later period. The apparent increase in GDP growth 82 
since 2013 in the US and globally is partially due to the reduced influence of the global financial crisis in 83 
2008/2009 from the smoothing process (see Methods, and compare Figure 2 and Supplementary Figure 84 
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1). Second, improvements in the energy intensity of GDP (Figure 2, purple) has ensured that energy 85 
consumption has grown more slowly than GDP (Supplementary Figure 2). The declines in energy 86 
intensity are an important long-term trend as economies develop, become more efficient, and shift to 87 
services5. Third, there are signs of emerging declines in carbon intensity of energy globally, in China and 88 
the US, and of continual declines in the EU28 (Figure 2, orange). The declining energy and carbon 89 
intensities ensure that CO2 emissions grow at a slower rate than GDP (Figure 2, black line).  90 
Emission scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement (Figure 3, top) show that stringent climate 91 
policy is expected to only slightly accelerate historical improvements in energy intensity compared to 92 
baseline scenarios. In contrast, the scenarios indicate that significant mitigation is achieved by deep and 93 
sustained reductions in the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 3, bottom). Identifying signs of emerging 94 
trends in the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 2) could be an early indicator of progress in mitigation.  95 
Due to the importance of carbon intensity of energy in emission scenarios and for emerging trends, we 96 
decompose the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 2, orange) into the share of fossil fuels in total energy 97 
consumption and carbon intensity of fossil fuel combustion (Level 3 in Figure 1; Figure 4). The trends 98 
vary by country, indicating the effectiveness of different factors. China has shown a strong decline in the 99 
share of fossil fuels in total energy consumption (orange) driven by growth in renewables, with continual 100 
improvements in the carbon emitted per unit of fossil fuel (green) due to a declining share of coal. The 101 
USA shows strong declines in carbon per unit of fossil fuel consumed (green) representing the gains 102 
from a shift from coal to natural gas, with smaller reductions from growth in renewables (orange). Our 103 
US results are consistent with an earlier study15, but we find that, to date, coal to gas is more important 104 
in driving US emissions than the expansion of renewables22 (Figure 4). The EU carbon intensity decline is 105 
dominated by the growing share of renewables in total energy consumption (orange), with decreasing 106 
gains from the carbon emitted from fossil fuel consumption (green). There are no clear trends in India. 107 
Globally, after a period of rapid recarbonisation6 in the 2000’s, there is an emerging trend of declining 108 
carbon intensity, primarily driven by an increased share of non-fossil energy sources.  109 
Despite the improvements in the carbon intensity of energy, and its components (Figure 4), energy 110 
consumption remains, in most cases, the dominant driver of CO2 emissions (Supplementary Figure 3). 111 
Although there has been strong growth in solar and wind power in recent years, the growth in global 112 
energy consumption has largely been dominated by increases in fossil fuel consumption and, to a much 113 
lesser extent, nuclear and hydro power (Supplementary Figure 4). Because of the recent decline in coal 114 
consumption in China12, the contribution of the growth in renewables to the growth in total energy was 115 
remarkably large globally in 2015 (~50%). In the US and EU, fossil fuel consumption continually declined, 116 
and the contributions of the growth in wind and solar power to the growth in energy consumption are 117 
more significant and, in some years, dominant.  118 
The recent gains in renewable energy consumption are significant, but it will be difficult for renewable 119 
energy to supply the entire annual growth in energy consumption in the short-term unless growth in 120 
global energy consumption declines further. If the annual growth in energy consumption remains stable, 121 
or declines further, then global CO2 emissions are likely to remain flat or even decline in the short-term. 122 
A return to stronger GDP and energy consumption growth could lead to renewed growth in emissions 123 
through increased capacity utilisation of existing coal plants and rapid construction of new coal plants23. 124 
Policies that lock in the recent reductions in coal consumption and avoid new capacity additions12, can 125 
potentially avoid a rebound in coal consumption and emissions18.  126 
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Future changes in the carbon intensity of energy (Figure 3) are driven by the development and 127 
deployment of particular technologies (Level 4 of Figure 1). Scenarios consistent with the Paris goal 128 
require a decreasing share of fossil fuels in energy use (Figure 5a). Despite the large increases in fossil 129 
energy consumption in the last decades, current trends in fossil energy emissions are still largely 130 
consistent with most 2°C scenarios (Supplementary Figure 5). However, declines in fossil energy, 131 
particularly coal, need to be initiated soon, particularly given existing infrastructure lock-in24.  132 
The relatively high fossil energy consumption in many 2°C scenarios is predicated on the large-scale 133 
deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in nearly all emission scenarios (Figure 5b). In 134 
addition, most scenarios require strong growth in bioenergy (Figure 5d), a large share which is linked 135 
with CCS for carbon dioxide removal25. It is uncertain whether bioenergy can be sustainably produced at 136 
the scales required26,27, but without the large-scale deployment of CCS most models cannot produce 137 
emission pathways consistent with the 2°C goal20,25. Despite its importance, deployment of CCS has 138 
continued to lag behind expectations13. Emission scenarios require many hundreds to thousands of CCS 139 
facilities by 2030 (Figure 5b), compared to the tens currently proposed28. Given the lack of focus on CCS 140 
in emission pledges7, a globally coordinated effort is needed to accelerate progress13, better understand 141 
the risks associated with pervasive diffusion, and address social acceptability29. 142 
Renewable energies are currently tracking well with the requirements of most emission scenarios 143 
consistent with 2°C (Figure 5). Despite the extraordinary growth rates of wind and solar in recent years, 144 
scenarios indicate that greatly accelerated expansion is required in the next decades. According to most 145 
scenarios there is limited scope for large-scale expansion of hydropower due to geophysical constraints. 146 
Most scenarios indicate strong growth in nuclear energy, but there is renewed uncertainty in light of the 147 
drop in public support since the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011. Scenario analysis indicates that 148 
renewables alone may not be sufficient to avoid 2°C due to the small remaining carbon budget and the 149 
difficulty of mitigation in some sectors20, such as agriculture and industry.  150 
Current trends in many indicators are broadly consistent with many of the emission scenarios that limit 151 
warming to well below 2°C (Figure 5), but this masks three critical issues. First, studies clearly show that 152 
up to 2030, current emission pledges quickly deviate from what is required to be consistent with the 153 
Paris goal1. Second, according to the 2°C scenarios, current trends of several key technologies (e.g., CCS) 154 
deviate substantially from long-term requirements. Third, for a given energy use, if some technologies 155 
lag considerably behind expectations13 or requirements20, then other technologies will need more rapid 156 
deployment and higher levels of penetration into the energy system. Of particular concern is the lack of 157 
scenarios exploring transformational lifestyle and behavioural changes, low-CCS and high renewables30, 158 
and alternative forms of carbon dioxide removal25,31 and solar radiation management32.  159 
The nested structure we have demonstrated and applied (Figure 1) facilitates the tracking of key 160 
indicators that need significant change over time to avoid 2°C of warming. The methodology allows a 161 
consistent and robust decomposition of current emission, energy, and technology trends, and thereby 162 
helps identify where future policy resources need to be placed. While tracking emissions is important, 163 
we argue that extending tracking across indicators, scales, and time periods will make it more likely that 164 
policies will be implemented that ensure the necessary societal transition consistent with the Paris 165 
Agreement.  166 
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 167 
Figure 1: A schematic hierarchy of potential indicators for tracking progress of the Paris Agreement at different levels. This 168 
schematic is not exhaustive and represents a disaggregation of indicators relevant for our analysis of recent trends in emissions, 169 
with a particular focus on the carbon intensity of energy (CO2/Energy). The upper layers are closer to the outcomes of policy, 170 
often used in emission pledges (emissions, emission intensity), while the lower layers represent more detailed technology inputs 171 
required to meet the outcomes. The structure can be analyzed over different time periods (years, decades, century). We only 172 
show CCS for fossil fuels, even though CCS apply to bioenergy and industry. Each horizontal layer represents a component of 173 
similar aggregation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product, CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage, CDR: Carbon Dioxide Removal.  174 
175 
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 176 
Figure 2: A Kaya Identity decomposition of CO2 emissions and its immediate drivers (Levels 1 & 2 in Figure 1), for the world (a), 177 
China (b), USA (c), EU28 (d), India (e), and the rest of the World (f); note varying y-axes. The data is smoothed with a 11-year 178 
window to show longer term trends, and the grey shading from 2010-2015 represents a diminishing window length as 2015 is 179 
approached. The missing data before 1995 is since there is no GDP data for the EU28 before 1990. Growth in GDP exerts upward 180 
pressure on emissions, energy efficiency (Energy/GDP) downward pressure, and in recent years, carbon intensity (CO2/Energy) 181 
downward pressure. “Cross” is a small interaction term (see Methods). See Supplementary Figure 1 for a non-smoothed version.182 
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 183 
Figure 3: Energy intensity of GDP (top) and carbon intensity of energy (bottom), both shown in Level 2 of Figure 1. Data is shown 184 
for the historical period (black), the 2°C scenarios assessed in AR538, and the median of the associated baselines (brown). The 185 
116 2°C scenarios are split into different categories with global climate policies starting in 2010 (blue), 2020 (red), and 2030 186 
(orange). The light lines are individual scenarios and the dark with white markers medians. Historically and in the long-term, 187 
Energy/GDP has trended downwards and the 2°C scenarios suggest only a slight acceleration to bridge the baseline trend with 188 
the 2°C scenarios. The scenarios indicate that most future mitigation is due to reductions in CO2/Energy, and this partly explains 189 
our focus on this term in our analysis.  190 
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 191 
Figure 4: A decomposition of the carbon intensity (CO2/Energy) into the carbon intensity of fossil fuel consumption (CO2/Fossil, 192 
called Fossil Intensity) and the share of fossil fuels in energy consumption (Fossil/Energy), Level 3 in Figure 1. Data shown are for 193 
the world (a), China (b), USA (c), EU28 (d), India (e), and the rest of the World (f). The data has been smoothed with a 11-year 194 
window to show longer term trends, and the grey shading from 2010-2015 represents a diminishing window length as 2015 is 195 
approached. The missing data for the EU before 1995 is since there is no data before 1990. “Cross” is a negligible interaction 196 
term (see Methods). 197 
198 
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 199 
Figure 5: Historical trends and future pathways for the fossil share of primary energy (a), fossil and bioenergy CCS (b), and 200 
renewable energy consumption disaggregated into solar and wind (c), biomass (d), nuclear (e), and hydropower (f). All panels 201 
show the historical period (black), the 2°C scenarios assessed in AR5, and the median of the associated baselines (brown). The 202 
116 2°C scenarios are split into different categories with global climate policies starting in 2010 (blue), 2020 (red), and 2030 203 
(orange). The light lines are individual scenarios and the dark with white markers medians. Current trends track well with most 204 
2°C scenarios, with the notable exception of CCS. If CCS does not live up to expectations, then alternative energy sources will be 205 
required to grow faster over longer periods of time. Additional energy sources and longer time periods are shown in 206 
Supplementary Figure 5.  207 
  208 
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Methods 281 
Kaya Identity. We apply the Kaya Identity in our core analysis5 282 
𝐶 = 𝐺 ×
𝐸
𝐺
×
𝐶
𝐸
= 𝐶 × 𝐼𝐸 × 𝐼𝐶 283 
where C is CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, G is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in constant 284 
prices, E is total primary energy use (fossil- and non-fossil fuels), IE is the energy use per unit GDP 285 
(energy intensity of GDP), and IC is the carbon emissions per unit energy use (carbon intensity of energy). 286 
We do not include population as a separate component, and instead focus on aggregated GDP. We find 287 
it is useful to further decompose the carbon intensity of energy, 288 
𝐼𝐶 =
𝐶
𝐸𝐹
×
𝐸𝐹
𝐸
= 𝐹𝑖 × 𝐹𝑠 289 
where EF is the primary energy consumption of fossil fuels, Fi is the carbon intensity of fossil fuel 290 
combustion and Fs is the share of fossil-fuel consumption in total energy consumption. 291 
Decomposition. We performing Index Decomposition Analysis33 (IDA) as we do not aim to assess 292 
structural changes. Further, we keep the number of components in each decomposition low to avoid 293 
difficulties interpreting the driver of changes34. A decomposition with n factors has n! unique 294 
decompositions and there are a variety of ways of dealing with non-uniqueness. We take standard 295 
forward differences and keep the interaction terms separate. As an example of a two factor 296 
decomposition, f=xy, 297 
∆𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑦(𝑡)∆𝑥 + 𝑥(𝑡)∆𝑦 + ∆𝑥∆𝑦 298 
where Δx(t)=x(t+Δt)-x(t). The strength of this approach is that in relative terms 299 
∆𝑓
𝑓(𝑡)
=
∆𝑥
𝑥(𝑡)
+
∆𝑦
𝑦(𝑡)
+ (
∆𝑥
𝑥(𝑡)
∆𝑦
𝑦(𝑡)
) 300 
each term is the standard annual growth rate (in percent) of each factor and the magnitude of the 301 
interaction term can be isolated. For example, for each year in Figure 2 the growth rate of CO2 emissions 302 
is the sum of the growth rates of GDP, energy intensity, and carbon intensity, with a small interaction 303 
term (labelled ‘cross’). 304 
Data. As explained in the main text, we focus on CO2 emissions from fossil fuels only. The CO2 emissions 305 
data3 is from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center35 (CDIAC) up to 2013 with 2014 and 2015 306 
projected by fuel-type based on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy36, but for developed countries 307 
we overwrite this data from 1990 to 2014 using official reports to the UNFCCC. The CDIAC emissions 308 
data did not include the full revisions to Chinese data37, so we followed the BP methodology36 to 309 
estimate the emissions by fuel type (to be consistent with CDIAC). The difference between Chinese 310 
estimates of CDIAC and BP were propagated through to the global total to ensure consistency. Energy 311 
data is taken from BP, which scales up all non-fossil energy sources by a factor 0.38 to account for 312 
different efficiencies of fossil and non-fossil fuels in producing final energy38. Further, BP only reports 313 
commercial biomass and we include traditional biomass from the International Energy Agency (IEA). 314 
GDP is taken from UN and is measured in constant 2005 prices39. Our analysis faces important data 315 
13 
 
challenges, but these should not affect our findings unduly. First, most developed countries officially 316 
report emission statistics (Annex I countries to the UNFCCC), though this will change as the Paris 317 
Agreement is implemented40. This limitation means that we have to source emission data for developing 318 
countries (non-Annex I countries) from non-official sources3. Second, economic and energy consumption 319 
data consistent with the reported emissions are rarely reported. Even though energy, economic, and 320 
emission statistics are ultimately all derived from official national data, third-party data suppliers and 321 
national governments may apply different assumptions, limiting the ability for reliably tracking of some 322 
NDCs. These challenges mean that we need to ensure our findings are not due to inconsistencies 323 
between different datasets. These issues have implications far beyond our analysis, and highlight the 324 
need for harmonised official reporting of economic, energy, and emission statistics. 325 
Projections. To estimate emissions in 2016 we separate out China, the US, and treat the rest of the 326 
world separately3. For China, we use monthly data from a variety of Chinese sources to estimate full 327 
year emissions3. For the US, we use estimates of fossil-fuel emissions from the US Energy Information 328 
Administration41, and supplement with estimates of cement consumption3. For the remaining countries, 329 
we add the 10-year average growth in CO2/GDP to GDP growth projections from the International 330 
Monetary Fund3. As emphasised elsewhere3, the 2016 estimates have additional uncertainties and the 331 
estimates should not be over interpreted. Most uncertainty lies in interpreting the uncertainties37 and 332 
future trends12 of Chinese emissions.  333 
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